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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Is an expressive boycott by court-appointed criminal 
defense attorneys designed to influence the passage of 
legislation protected by the first amendment from antitrust 
prosecution?
2. Does application of the rule of reason, which requires 
the FTC to prove that the Lawyers' conduct had an anticompetitive 
effect, adequately protect the government's interest in 
preserving competition when balanced against the Lawyers' first 
amendment rights?
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No. 88-1198
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FALL TERM 1989
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
Petitioner,
V.
SUPERIOR COURT TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION 
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinions of the administrative law judge and the Federal 
Trade Commissioner are reported at In re Superior Court Trial 
Lawyers Ass'n. 107 F.T.C. 510 (1986). The opinion of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is reported 
at Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
856 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia was entered on August 26, 1988. A timely 
petition for writ of certiorari was filed. It was granted on 
April 17, 1989. The jurisdiction of this Court rests upon 28 
U.S.C. section 1254(1).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
This case involves the first amendment and sixth amendment 
to the United States Constitution and section 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. section 1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1964, the District of Columbia enacted the Criminal 
Justice Act ("CJA”) to provide for the defense of indigent 
defendants in criminal cases. The CJA provides reimbursement to 
private, court-appointed attorneys for their defense of the 
indigent accused. (J.A. 6.) Any local member of the D.C. bar in 
good standing may receive CJA appointments. Court employees 
allocate the defense cases on a first come, first served basis to 
the attorneys who have indicated their CJA availability on a 
daily basis. (J.A. 8.) Approximately 1,200 lawyers are 
registered with the CJA office at any one time, but most 
appointments go to a group of 100 attorneys who almost 
exclusively represent clients under the CJA. (J.A. 7.) CJA 
attorneys are responsible for roughly 85% of the indigence cases. 
(J.A. 7.)
Respondent Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association ("the 
Lawyers") is a loosely organized association of CJA attorneys 
which became the organizing force of the boycott at issue in this 
case. (J.A. 10.) CJA compensation rates have been raised only 
once since 1964, and in 1983 the Lawyers were being compensated 
at rates set 13 years earlier without any cost-of-living 
adjustments ($20 per hour for out of court, $30 per hour for in
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court, subject to specific ceilings per case). (J.A. 10.) The 
average CJA attorney makes about $20,000 per year and works 
without any support services. (J.A. 12.)
In 1975, years prior to the current boycott, a committee 
report found that the existing rates were too low and adversely 
impacted the quality of representation. (J.A. 12.) The report 
also found that the inadequate rates were partially responsible 
for the attrition of experienced CJA attorneys and the 
unwillingness of new and qualified professionals to enter the 
criminal defense practice. It recommended to raise the fee to a 
uniform rate of $40 per hour. (J.A. 11.) Several later reports 
expressed concern about possible violations of the sixth 
amendment based on inadequate trial preparation. (J.A. 12.)
The pre-boycott reform efforts of the Lawyers failed largely 
because neither indigent defendants, nor their criminal defense 
attorneys were significant political constituencies. This had an 
adverse impact on the availability of public funds for their 
concerns. (J.A. 16.)
Prior to the boycott in 1983, Lawyers vigorously petitioned 
the legislature to change the compensation rates under the Act. 
Their lobbying effort included meetings with the D.C. Mayor and 
the Chief Judge of the Superior Court. The Chief Judge refused 
to support reform legislation because the Superior Court might 
have to rule on the legality of an eventual bill, and the Mayor's 
office informed the Lawyers that though the Mayor supported their 
position, he could not push for reform without the Chief Judge's
3
endorsement. (J.A. 13.)
In 1982, the D.C. Council introduced a reform bill, but the 
bill died due to an alleged lack of funding. Nevertheless, in 
1983, based upon the consistent lobbying efforts of the Lawyers, 
the D.C. Council Chairman introduced another bill. (J.A. 14) In 
June of 1983, a Councilmember and the city's Budget Director 
informed the Lawyers that, once again, no money could be found to 
fund the measure. Although the entire D.C. government supported 
the bill, the Lawyers realized that it had a very low chance of 
actual passage. (J.A- 14.) The Lawyers eventually voted in 
favor of a boycott in case the bill failed to pass by September 
6, 1983. Nonetheless, the CJA leadership continued its lobbying 
efforts through the late summer. (J.A. 15.) On August 29, 1983, 
the Lawyers met with the Mayor, who supported the bill and was 
fully aware of the impending boycott, yet emphasized that he was 
unable to push for passage of the legislation in the absence of 
an emergency situation. (J.A. 15.)
In connection with the boycott efforts, the Lawyers 
organized several public awareness events, including rallies and 
press interviews. (J.A. 17.) When their lobbying efforts 
failed, they refused to take on new cases. Within a few days the 
Mayor pressed for passage of emergency legislation basing his 
pleas on "the importance of quality representation of indigent 
defendants." (J.A. 19.) The availability of attorneys willing 
to take CJA cases increased immediately after the boycott. (J.A. 
16.)
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During the boycott the FTC filed suit alleging that the 
Lawyers had conspired to fix prices and to conduct a boycott in 
violation of antitrust laws. (J.A. 2.) The District of Columbia 
never asked the FTC to intervene, nor did it assert its own 
antitrust provisions. (J.A. 2.)
In the initial decision, the administrative law judge held 
that although the boycott did not constitute petitioning for 
legislation or a political activity, it failed to have an adverse 
effect on competition. (J.A. 26.) He further found that at the 
post-boycott rates the number of lawyers willing to take CJA 
cases increased. (J.A. 20.)
On appeal, the Federal Trade Commissioner reversed on the 
issue of liability and concluded that the boycott was per se 
illegal because it represented a facially anticompetitive 
agreement. (J.A. 45.)
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that although 
the boycott fell within the type of activity which usually 
violated the Sherman Act, it could not be held illegal per se.
The Court refrained from granting first amendment immunity to the 
boycott, but reasoned that to adequately account for the Lawyers' 
first amendment rights, the FTC had to prove that the Lawyers 
possessed sufficient market power in order to justify the 
condemnation of an expressive boycott.
The FTC is now asking for a reversal of the D.C. Circuit's 
ruling requiring a finding of market power.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The first amendment protects the Lawyers' conduct from 
antitrust prosecution on two grounds. Firstly, the Lawyers 
petitioned the legislature through their boycott. This Court has 
established a doctrine which exempts private efforts to petition 
the legislature from antitrust prosecution if they are taken in 
an appropriate context and are of the appropriate nature. Given 
the unique context and nature of their conduct, the Lawyers are 
exempt from antitrust prosecution.
Secondly, the Lawyers' action advanced the constitutional 
right to adequate counsel of their indigent defendants. Because 
the Lawyers' clients are an underrepresented class not in a 
position to petition the legislature for change themselves, the 
Lawyers' action represents political expression deserving first 
amendment protection.
Alternatively, if this Court does not find that the Lawyers' 
conduct was immune from antitrust laws, it should hold that the 
rule of reason applies to this case. The per se rule, which 
presumes the anticompetitive effect of a restraint, is limited to 
cases involving horizontal price constraints that obviously 
suppress competition.
The rule of reason analysis requires the FTC to prove that 
the boycott constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade within 
the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Under the rule of 
reason, the court must inquire into the industry in which the 
restraint was applied, its history and the market conditions
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before and after the restraint. In a legislatively controlled 
market, which provides a constitutionally mandated service to an 
indigent customer, traditional antitrust analysis leads to a 
distorted result. In the long-run, the Lawyers' actions served 
to increase the effectiveness of and the competition for legal 
representation of indigent defendants in the District of 
Columbia. Their conduct further advanced the sixth amendment 
right to counsel of indigent defendants who lack the means to 
advocate their own constitutional rights.
Because the Lawyers' conduct involved active lobbying of the 
D.C. legislature and an extensive media campaign, their eventual 
boycott contained a strong expressive component. In United 
States v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), this Court held that 
conduct with an expressive component should not be restricted in 
any non-essential manner. To apply the per se rule and presume 
that this type of conduct most likely restricts competition would 
violate the Lawyers' first amendment rights. In balancing the 
government's interest in maintaining competition against the 
Lawyers' first amendment rights, the government's interest is 
sufficiently protected if the FTC is required to prove the 
anticompetitive effect of the Lawyers' conduct.
ARGUMENT
I. BECAUSE THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS NON-VIOLENT FORMS OF 
POLITICAL EXPRESSION FROM PROHIBITION, THE CJA LAWYERS* 
ACTION TO REFORM THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWS IS EXEMPT FROM 
ANTITRUST PROSECUTION.
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The framers of the Bill of Rights recognized the importance 
of free expression to a representative democracy by enacting the 
first amendment which prevents the government from prosecuting 
groups for expressive activity. U.S. Const, amend. I. The 
petitioners, a governmental agency, seek to prosecute the Lawyers 
for their concerted action in protest of an unjust criminal 
defense system. The Lawyers* conduct is protected from antitrust 
prosecution by the first amendment for two reasons. Firstly, the 
Lawyers* petitioned the legislature through their boycott. The 
Noerr doctrine, established by this Court in Eastern R.R. 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight. 365 U.S. 127 (1961), exempts 
such efforts from antitrust prosecution. Secondly, the Lawyers* 
action advanced the interests of their clients as well as their 
own because it served to protect the constitutional right of 
indigents to adequate counsel. U.S. Const, amend. VI. Because 
the Lawyers' clients are not in a position to petition the 
legislature for change themselves, the Lawyers' action represents 
political expression deserving first amendment protection.
A. The Noerr doctrine exempts the Lawyers' effort to
petition the legislature from antitrust prosecution.
Decisions of this Court establish an exception from 
antitrust laws for actions designed to petition the legislature. 
The exception gained its name from the Noerr case. Noerr. 365 
U.S. 127. The defendants in Noerr. an association of railroads 
and their public relations firm, launched an allegedly fraudulent 
publicity campaign designed to promote laws and enforcement
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practices harmful to the trucking industry. The plaintiffs,
representatives of the trucking industry, alleged that the
defendants had illegally used the campaign to monopolize the long
distance freight market. The trial court found the campaign to
be a malicious and fraudulent attempt to destroy the truckers as
competitors and held that the campaign violated the Sherman Act.
Noerr. 365 U.S. at 132-33.
While acknowledging the anticompetitive purpose and
potential effect of the campaign, this Court exempted the
defendant's conduct from antitrust violations:
To hold that the government retains the power to act 
in [a] representative capacity and yet hold, at the 
same time, that the people cannot freely inform the 
government of their wishes would impute to the Sherman 
Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but 
political activity, a purpose which would have no basis 
whatever in the legislative history of that Act.
Noerr. 365 U.S. at 137. In refusing to impute to Congress an
intent to invade the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights,
Id. at 138, this Court found that unless a publicity campaign was
a "mere sham" constructed to injure a competitor, the right to
petition should be protected. Id. at 144.
The Noerr exception applies to petitioners of the
legislature with self-interested motives. The Noerr court
reasoned that:
[a] construction of the Sherman Act that would disqualify 
people from taking a public position on matters in which 
they are financially interested would thus deprive the 
government of a valuable source of information and, at the 
same time, deprive the people of their right to petition in 
the very instances in which that right may be of the most 
importance to them.
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Id. at 139. Subsequent case law confirmed the Noerr rationale in
excepting self-interested petitioners from antitrust liability.
In the case of United Mine Workers v. Pennington. 381 U.S. 657 
(1965) , the trial court instructed the jury that if an 
anticompetitive purpose was found, they were free to find an 
illegal conspiracy. This Court found the instruction to be 
reversible error. Referring to the Noerr case, the Court stated 
that "[njothing could be clearer from the Court's opinion than 
that anticompetitive purpose did not illegalize the conduct there 
involved." Pennington. 381 U.S. at 669. Thus, whether or not 
the Lawyers' conduct was motivated by their own economic gain, 
the Noerr doctrine should apply to this case. The key factor is 
not their motive as the Pennington case emphasized, but whether 
or not their effort was an attempt to petition the legislature 
protected by the first amendment.
In the present case, the Lawyers were clearly petitioning 
the legislature as required by Noerr. Their conduct was a direct 
attempt to influence the body responsible for funding the defense 
of indigent defendants to reform the criminal defense rate 
structure. The group did all that it could to attract the 
attention of the public and votes of the legislators both prior 
to and during the boycott. They met with members of the 
legislature, the Mayor, and the Chief Judge of the Superior Court 
on numerous occasions. All agreed that a change was needed, but 
no action was taken. After thirteen years of inaction by the 
legislature, with caseloads growing, more and more experienced
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attorneys leaving the practice and real income steadily 
declining, the Lawyers needed a vehicle to reach beyond the 
polite smiles and nods of elected officials who expressed great 
sympathy for the Lawyers* cause, but declined to fund that cause 
until an emergency situation had arisen. In this political 
context the Lawyers' boycott was their only effective way of 
making their (and their clients') predicament known to the public 
and keeping it before the legislature.
The Lawyers' petition of the legislature was no "mere sham" 
in order to hurt a competitor, but a genuine effort to influence 
governmental action. The group initiated a concerted publicity 
campaign to educate the public as to their plight. They staged 
rallies, walked picket lines, handed out press kits, and gave 
newspaper and television interviews, all in their effort to bring 
political pressure to bear on the elected officials. Given the 
extensive efforts of the Lawyers to keep the CJA bills before the 
legislature, the Lawyers' actions must be seen as an effort to 
petition the legislature as required by Noerr.
The Noerr holding did not extend to cases involving both a 
boycott and an effort to petition the legislature. The Noerr 
Court granted an antitrust exception to the railroad 
association's publicity campaign partially because it bore little 
resemblance to a combination traditionally held violative of 
antitrust laws. Though the Lawyers did petition the legislature, 
they did so at least partially by combining to form a boycott.
The Noerr Court did not include such a combination within its
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holding, but neither did it exclude it. Noerr. 365 U.S. at 136. 
Fortunately, subsequent precedent has established the appropriate 
standard in such cases.
This Court clarified the scope of the Noerr antitrust 
exception in a recent case. In Allied Tube & Conduit Corn, v. 
Indian Head. Inc.. 486 U.S. 492, 108 S.Ct. 1931 (1988), a 
polyvinyl conduit manufacturer brought an antitrust action 
against steel conduit manufacturers for preventing its product 
from being accepted under the privately formed industry standards 
often adopted by the government. The Allied Court adopted a 
standard for immunity from antitrust laws under the Noerr 
exception: ''[t]he scope of this protection depends ... on the 
source, context, and nature of the anticompetitive restraint at 
issue." Allied. 108 S.Ct. at 1936. If the source of an 
anticompetitive restraint such as a boycott is from private 
action, "the restraint cannot form the basis for antitrust 
liability if it is incidental' to a valid effort to influence 
governmental action. The validity of such efforts, and thus the 
applicability of Noerr immunity, varies with the context and 
nature of the activity." Id. at 1936 (citations omitted). This 
Court declined to extend protection to the context of the case 
where the facts involved the lobbying of a private, standard­
setting organization to exclude a commercial product from the 
market through its standards. The Court rejected the notion that 
the organization was a quasi-legislative body. Allied. 108 S.Ct. 
at 1939. Absent the presence of a legislative body, the
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manufacturers' efforts fell into the context of commercial 
activity subject to antitrust prosecution. Id. at 1939.
The Lawyers' action, when viewed in its context and consid­
ering its nature, was a valid effort to influence governmental 
action. Unlike the Allied context, the context of the Lawyers' 
action demands first amendment protection. In Allied. this Court 
excluded the lobbying of a private standard setting association 
from antitrust immunity, however the Lawyers, like the railroads 
in Noerr. lobbied the legislature and not a private group. In 
Allied. the manufacturers attempted to keep a competing product 
out of the market. The Lawyers wanted to keep talented attorneys 
in the CJA practice and to attract new attorneys into the 
practice. Allied involved manufacturers of commercial products 
competing for shares of a limited market. The Lawyers within the 
SCTLA did not attempt to win benefits for their group alone, but 
for any lawyers who wished to defend indigent defendants within 
the district. Every attorney who places her name on the CJA list 
receives the same rate of compensation regardless of group 
membership or experience. Furthermore, the manufacturers in 
Allied sought solely to further their own pecuniary interest.
The Lawyers' action, though not devoid of self-interest, served 
to advance the constitutional rights of their clients as well. 
Finally, the factfinder in Allied found that the manufacturers 
had actually had an adverse impact on competition. Id. at 1936. 
In contrast, the administrative law judge in the present case 
found that "there was no harm done" by the Lawyers' actions. In
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re SCTLA> 107 F.T.C. at 561. For these foregoing reasons, the 
holding in Allied is not controlling in the present case.
Notwithstanding the Lawyers' use of a boycott, the unique 
factual context of the present case requires first amendment 
protection. The refusal of the group to take on any new cases 
took place within the broader context of their campaign to change 
existing laws. The Lawyers* had had little success getting their 
views out to the general public without the vehicle of a boycott. 
The Lawyers are not endowed with the financial resources of the 
railroad association in the Noerr case and thus could not stage 
an expensive publicity campaign. At the time of the boycott they 
had an average income of approximately $20,000 per year. 
Furthermore, they do not have a constituency to rely on for 
fundraising, and the indigents whom they represent are largely 
without financial resources. Much like the Mayor, the newsmedia 
were not concerned with a thirteen year old problem of the 
criminally accused and their lawyers until an emergency situation 
had been reached. The boycott provided the Lawyers with a way to 
reach out to the broader public and convey the gravity of their 
problem. In this context, such an expressive boycott should be 
protected by the first amendment.
Given the particular context and nature of the Lawyers' 
action and given the administrative law judge's finding that no 
harm was done by the action, the restraint on trade caused by the 
action, if any, was only incidental to their valid effort to 
influence governmental action. The Noerr immunity applies to
such efforts. Hence, the Lawyers' actions are immune from 
antitrust prosecution.
B. Because the Lawyers' conduct served to protect the 
constitutional rights of an underrepresented class.
this Court must award the Lawyers first amendment
protection.
This Court exempts boycotts from antitrust prosecution when 
the boycott at issue promotes the constitutional rights of an 
underrepresented class. NAACP v. Claiborne. 458 U.S. 886,
(1982). Because the Lawyers' boycott promoted the sixth 
amendment right to adequate counsel of the Lawyers' 
underrepresented clients, the action should be immune from 
antitrust prosecution. In Claiborne. this Court reversed a state 
court judgment entered against the NAACP and individual 
defendants who participated in a boycott against white merchants. 
The boycott aimed at insuring racial justice by, among other 
things, forcing local merchants to hire more blacks. The Court 
applied a Noerr analysis to the case and found that a major 
purpose of the boycott was to influence government action and 
that the boycotters sought to vindicate the constitutional rights 
of an underprivileged class. Given the constitutional 
orientation of the boycott, the Court deemed the boycott 
"political activity." Claiborne. 458 U.S. at 914.
The Lawyers' activity, like the boycott in Claiborne, is 
political because it promoted the constitutional rights of an 
underrepresented class. The Lawyers represent an 
underrepresented class of defendants entitled to counsel under
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the sixth amendment. See Gideon v. Wainwriaht. 372 U.S. 335 
(1963); Scott v. Illinois. 440 U.S. 367 (1979). Though the 
indigent accused are entitled to this right, they are not 
realistically in a position to protect their own sixth amendment 
rights to adequate counsel while incarcerated or awaiting trial. 
Moreover, much like the boycotters in Claiborne, they are an 
unpopular class in the eyes of the majority of the electorate and 
have a correspondingly weak lobbying voice. In both Claiborne 
and in this case, the underrepresented class needed the impetus 
of an outside organization to protect their constitutional 
rights. In both cases, the boycotts were desperate attempts to 
show the injustice done to a politically weak group. Given the 
similarity of the Lawyers' case to the Claiborne case, the 
Lawyers' action should be similarly classed as political 
activity.
The Claiborne boycott was not devoid of a 
self-interested motive. In Claiborne. the boycotters stood not 
only to gain political power, but economic power as well. One of 
the group's demands was for the shop owners to hire more black 
workers. Since almost the entire group of boycotters were black, 
this would directly benefit the boycotting group. Additionally, 
blacks stood to benefit economically from their integration into 
the political system. This Court nonetheless recognized that the 
economic benefits of the boycott were part and parcel to the 
protection of the constitutional rights and granted the boycott 
first amendment protection. Because the economic benefit
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received by the Lawyers is inexorably linked to the preservation 
of their clients' constitutional right to counsel, the Lawyers' 
boycott deserves similar protection.
In Claiborne, this Court refused to shut its eyes to the 
political realities of a divided city in the Deep South with 
divided voting rights. The Court's decision reflected the fact 
that blacks did not have the means to make their demands heard 
through the normal political lobbying system. The Lawyers' case 
demands a similar realistic appraisal. The popularly elected 
branches of government are not reelected because they provide for 
the defense of the criminally accused. In the present political 
climate, in which many a politician campaigns for reelection on 
the increased number of criminal convictions achieved in his or 
her previous term of office and on the promotion of victims* 
rights, it is extremely difficult to gain political momentum in 
favor of spending more tax dollars on defending the accused.
Given this political reality and the importance of the sixth 
amendment to our system of criminal justice, the Lawyers' conduct 
deserves wide-ranging first amendment protection.
Finally, the Lawyers should not be forced to wait until the 
sixth amendment rights of their clients have completely 
deteriorated before forcefully defending these rights. As the 
Lawyers* real income declined year after year, they were forced 
to take on an increasing caseload without adding support staff. 
This pattern is doomed to lead to injustice due to inadequate 
counsel. Once injustice has occurred and an innocent person is
17
convicted due to inadequate defense counsel, it is very difficult 
to correct. To overturn his conviction due to lack of adequate 
counsel, the criminal defendant faces a heavy burden at the 
appellate level. Criminal defendants should not be forced to 
seek justice retroactively through the costly and time consuming 
appellate process. The Lawyers' boycott served to avert such 
injustice at their own hands and, therefore, deserves first 
amendment protection.
II. THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE
LAWYERS DO NOT FIT INTO THE TRADITIONAL ANTITRUST BUSINESS 
CONTEXT BECAUSE THE LAWYERS' EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT COUPLED WITH 
ITS PROCOMPETITIVE POTENTIAL OUTWEIGH ANY TRANSITORY 
ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS.
To be unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Act, a 
restraint of trade must be unreasonable. See Chicago Bd. of 
Trade v. United States. 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Standard Oil v. 
United States. 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). In determining whether 
restraints of trade unreasonably restrict competition, this Court 
has used two methods of analysis: the rule of reason and the per 
se rule. Under each rule, the purpose of analysis is to form a 
judgment about the significance of the restraint. National Soc'v 
of Professional Engineers v. United States. 435 U.S. 679, 691 
(1978) .
The inquiry mandated by the rule of reason is whether the 
challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that 
suppresses it. To decide that question, courts have consistently 
followed the criteria set out by Justice Brandeis in Chicago 
Board. 246 U.S. at 231. Courts have looked at the peculiar
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characteristics of the industry in which the restraint was 
applied, its condition before and after the imposition of the 
restraint and the history of the restraint. The focus of the 
analysis under the rule of reason is the impact of the practice 
on competition in a relevant market.
Certain agreements "that would always or almost always tend 
to restrict competition and decrease output" have been condemned 
as per se illegal without extensive industry analysis or 
thoughtful consideration of legitimate justifications. Arizona 
V. Maricopa County Medical Soc'v. 457 U.S. 332, 334 (1982); 
Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting System. 441 U.S. 1, 19- 
20 (1970). Although horizontal price and output restrictions, 
including boycotts, have typically been subject to the per se 
rule, several recent decisions refused to apply the per se rule 
because "the challenged practices may have redeeming competitive 
virtues." Broadcast Music. 441 U.S. at 9, 13; see also National 
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents. 468 U.S. 85 (1984); 
Northern Wholesale Stationers v. Pac. Stationers & Printing. 472
U.S. 284 (1985); Rotherv Storage & Van v. Atlas Van Lines. 792 
F.2d 210, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
A. The per se rule should not apply to the Lawyers' 
conduct because the per se analysis is limited to
factual situations which always or almost always tend
to restrict competition.
Because application of the per se rule forecloses any 
analysis of a restraint's purpose, its nature and its market 
effect, this Court has restricted the per se rule to those
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categories of restraints for which no elaborate study of the 
industry is needed to determine that the nature and the effect 
are obviously anticompetitive. Broadcast Music. 441 U.S. at 8; 
Professional Engineers. 435 U.S. at 50.
Trade restraints which this Court has analyzed according to 
the per se rule facially satisfy three criteria: (1) the 
restraint denies something to a competitor which it needs to 
compete effectively; (2) the parties entering into the 
restraining agreement occupy a dominant position in the relevant 
market; and (3) there exists no plausible contention that the 
challenged behavior would enhance overall efficiency and make the 
market more competitive. Federal Trade Common v. Indiana Fed*n 
of Dentists. 476 U.S. 447 (1986); NCAA. 468 U.S. 85; see also 
Maricopa Countv. 457 U.S. 332; Broadcast Music. 441 U.S. 1.
The Lawyers' conduct did not meet any of these three 
prerequisites to the application of the per se rule. Firstly, to 
compete effectively in the market for criminal defense of 
indigents, access to the CJA system was necessary. Any local 
member in good standing of the D.C. bar could receive CJA 
appointments. A court official assigned the cases on a daily 
basis by randomly matching the names of the indigent defendants 
with any attorney who had indicated her availability. The 
Lawyers had no control over this assignment procedure. They 
never urged the court officials to participate in their campaign, 
nor persuaded them to interrupt the appointment process. Hence, 
every D.C. attorney had uninhibited access to CJA cases.
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Secondly, the Lawyers did not occupy a sufficiently dominant
position in an economic market to force D.C. attorneys to refuse
CJA appointments. In evaluating a group's market power, courts
have primarily looked to the potential substitutes which enter
the market promptly. The relevant market includes all
alternative suppliers that will quickly enter the market in
response to a small price increase, as well as those that may
take longer to enter. While the Lawyers attempted to discourage
many of their colleagues from accepting appointments, they did
not force them to reject CJA cases. In a recent antitrust
decision, this Court reasoned that:
The per se approach has generally been limited to cases 
in which firms with market power boycott suppliers or 
customers in order to discourage them from doing 
business with a competitor. . . . Moreover, we have 
been slow to extend per se analysis to restraints where 
the economic impact ... is not immediately obvious.
Indiana Dentists. 476 U.S. at 451.
Thirdly, the number of attorneys willing to take CJA cases
immediately after the Lawyers' campaign increased. In Pacific
Stationary, this Court reiterated the traditional framework of
analysis under section 1 of the Sherman Act:
Rule-of-reason analysis guides the inquiry, unless the 
challenged action falls into the category of agreements 
or practices which because of their pernicious effect 
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are 
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore 
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise 
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their 
use.
Id. at 289 (citations omitted).
The boycott was never aimed at driving potential competitors
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from the market. Quite the contrary, the Lawyers desired to 
improve their working conditions and the quality of their 
services, which inevitably increases the attractiveness of the 
market. The fact that after the campaign more attorneys entered 
the CJA practice shows that such a campaign does not always tend 
to decrease competition.
B. The presumption that the Lawyers' expressive conduct
constituted an unreasonable restraint on competition
violates their first amendment right to protection.
As stated above, first amendment limitations on governmental
antitrust regulation have been acknowledged in Claiborne, 458
U.S. at 912. Applying the per se rule to this case would abridge
the Lawyers' first amendment rights because their conduct
included political expression in the form of petitioning the
government for grievances, lobbying and, lastly, boycotting.
Given this political context, the case of United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), enunciated the four-part test
which is appropriate when balancing the government's interest and
the Lawyers' first amendment rights:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified 
(1) if it is within the constitutional power of the 
Government; (2) if it furthers an important or substantial 
government interest; (3) if the government's interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) if 
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment 
freedoms is no greater than essential to the furtherance of 
that interest. ’
Id. at 377.
In O'Brien, the defendant was convicted for violating a 
federal statute making the knowing destruction of a draft card a 
criminal offense. This Court held that the statute at issue, on 
its face and as applied to O'Brien, met the four-part test.
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In balancing the government's interest in preserving free 
enterprise and the Lawyers' first amendment rights, the 
government's interest is sufficiently protected if it can prove 
the actual harmful impact on competition. The first three 
requirements of the test are undisputed, but the last one, the 
presumption that the Lawyers' conduct constituted a per se 
violation of the Sherman Act, cannot stand per O'Brien. The 
government's interest in preserving competition is adequately 
protected if it has to prove that the restraint in fact had an 
adverse effect on competition. Presuming that conduct which 
includes an expressive component violated the antitrust laws 
would restrict the first amendment rights in a manner greater 
than essential.
The Lawyers' eventual decision not to take further cases and 
to encourage the passage of legislation occurred in a political 
context. They had supporters in the entire community: the Mayor, 
members of the City Council, Congress and legal and 
administrative personnel of the judiciary. Nonetheless, there 
was no motivation for either the Mayor or the Council to actively 
support the CJA reform. The Council was not pushed to act 
because the indigent defendants and their attorneys did not 
constitute an important political constituency. The executive 
faced more popular projects, and the alleged lack of funding was 
the perfect way to shift responsibility. The Chief Judge at the 
Superior Court voiced his concern about having to eventually pass 
on the constitutionality of the legislation. When the lobbying
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for legislative change stalled, the Lawyers looked for other 
means to bring the status quo to the attention of the public.
They staged a media campaign, a petition drive and finally 
decided not to take further cases. Their publicity efforts 
reveal their social conscience to use political and democratic 
channels to achieve their goals.
The per se rule is an evidentiary shortcut designed to 
achieve administrative convenience and cost efficiency. Under 
the rule, a court does not have to establish detailed factual 
findings about the specific industry in which the restraint 
occurred. In the present situation, however, the presumptive 
effect of the rule would swallow the possibility that the Lawyers 
campaign changed the public attitude and influenced the passage 
of the bill. The media campaigns, the petition drives and the 
active lobbying for legislation manifested the expressive 
component of the boycott. The Court of Appeals recognized the 
possibility that the Lawyers "procured a rate increase by 
changing public attitude through the publicity attending the 
boycott." SCTLA. 856 F.2d at 251.
The anticompetitive effect on the other hand is not obvious. 
In this context, convenience and efficiency cannot outweigh first 
amendment rights without violating the fourth prong of O’Brien. 
The Court of Appeals pointed out that condemning the boycott as 
anticompetitive without proof "ignores the command in O’Brien 
that restrictions on activity protected by the first amendment be 
no greater than is essential* to preserve competition." SCTLA.
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r856 F.2d at 249.
C. The untraditional market in which the Lawyers provided
their services and the unpredictability of adverse
economic effects on competition require a detailed
industry analysis pursuant to the rule of reason.
In light of this untraditional market, an application of the 
per se rule would violate the frequently announced principle that 
courts should not classify restraints as per se violations of the 
Sherman Act unless they have had considerable experience with 
similar business relations. Maricopa Countv. 457 U.S. at 343; 
United States v. Topco Ass'n. 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972). This 
is a case of first impression involving first and sixth amendment 
rights and an untraditional market. The market is unique in that 
the price is legislatively set, the actual consumers do not pay 
for the services provided to them, and the government has a 
constitutional obligation to ensure that the indigent defendants 
are adequately represented. Because prices are set through the 
political process, any price adjustments necessarily involve the 
first amendment right to petition the government. Without 
examining this particular market, this Court cannot evaluate 
whether the price adjustment was due to political persuasion or 
economic coercion.
Cases attempting to justify price fixing agreements on a 
public service rationale cannot be controlling here. In Goldfarb 
V. Virginia State Bar. 421 U.S. 773 (1975), this Court rejected 
the contention that the public service aspect of title 
examinations for real property warranted a minimum fee schedule.
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The Virginia State Bar had vigorously enforced a minimum fee 
schedule for real estate title examinations by threatening 
disciplinary actions in case of deviations. In Professional 
Engineers. this Court considered a provision in a trade 
association's canon of ethics which prohibited competitive 
bidding prior to the selection of an engineer by a prospective 
client. The purpose of this rule was to minimize the risk that 
fierce price competition would lead to inferior engineering 
design and endanger public safety. This Court did not 
acknowledge this purpose as an affirmative defense and concluded 
that the ban was anticompetitive. In both cases there existed 
elements of a true economic bargain. The clients could 
differentiate according to price, quality and professional 
experience. In the present context, however, the government only 
offers one price regardless of experience and expertise, and the 
clients are assigned to the defense attorneys through an 
administrative procedure. Consequently, applying the per se rule 
would lead to an economically distorted and unconstitutional 
result.
D. The Lawyers' conduct was reasonably necessary to ensure
constitutionally adequate representation as mandated by
the sixth amendment.
A "practice reasonably necessary to accomplish a legitimate 
business purpose that produces only an insignificant restriction 
of competition is not unlawful." Topco. 405 U.S. at 606. As 
attorneys and members of the bar, the Lawyers had a professional 
duty to provide adequate legal services to their clients. This
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duty constitutes a legitimate business purpose. While their 
services might not have fallen below a professional standard, it 
would be unsound public policy and economically inefficient to 
wait until that point had been reached.
Their conduct have had an incidental adverse effect on 
competition. However, this transient impact was insignificant 
and therefore not unlawful. Following the rate increase more 
attorneys were willing to represent indigent criminals and the 
CJA regulars did not increase their case load. The Lawyers' 
temporary supply restricting arrangement was not any broader than 
necessary to accomplish its procompetitive goals.
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CONCLUSION
The Lawyers* actions should be protected by the first 
amendment for two reasons. Firstly, the first amendment shields 
valid efforts to petition the legislature from antitrust prosecu­
tion. Secondly, the first amendment protects boycott efforts 
that are made in furtherance of the constitutional rights of an 
underrepresented class.
Alternatively, should this Court deny the Lawyers first 
amendment immunity, the Court should apply the rule of reason 
analysis to this case and thus require the government to prove an 
anticompetitive effect.
For the foregoing reasons, the Lawyers prays this Court to 
reverse the decision of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and 
hold that (1) the first amendment exempts the Lawyers* actions in 
this case from antitrust prosecution. If the Court does not so 
hold, then the Respondent prays this Court to affirm the Court of 
Appeals* decision and hold that (2) the per se analysis cannot be 
applied in this case.
Dated: November 15, 1989.
Respectfully submitted,
Counsel for Respondent
STATUTORY APPENDIX
U.S. Constitution, amendment I:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. Constitution, amendment VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and the 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence.
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. section 1:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal.
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